What is your, what is yours, what is yours
What is your signaling game[1]
What is your, what is yours, what is yours
What is your signaling game
In a signaling game
One sender, one receiver[2]
The sender has two types, good or bad, good or bad?
Is your signaling true, true or false?
This is Bayesian strategy, perfect Bayesian strategy[3]
This is Bayesian strategy, perfect Bayesian strategy
What is your, what is yours, what is yours
What is your signaling game
What is your, what is yours, what is yours
What is your signaling game
In a signaling game
One sender, one receiver
The sender has two types, good or bad, good or bad?
Is your signaling true, true or false?
This is Bayesian strategy, perfect Bayesian strategy
This is Bayesian strategy, perfect Bayesian strategy
Cheap talk, cheap talk, this is not cheap talk
This is Bayesian strategy, perfect Bayesian strategy
Cheap talk, cheap talk, this is not cheap talk.[4]
* Text by Marco Marini. Music by Marco Marini, Elisa Pezzuto and Valter Sacripanti. All rights reserved.
Voices: Marco Marini, Elisa Pezzuto. Guitars: David Pieralisi, Marco Marini, Bass: David Pieralisi. Drum: Valter Sacripanti,
Production: Valter Sacripanti. Mastering: Fabrizio De Carolis.
[1] A signaling game is a specific type of dynamic Bayesian game. The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes an action, a signal, to convey information to another player, where sending the signal is costlier when conveying false information. A firm, for instance, could provide a warranty for its product to signal consumers about the reliability of its product. Another example is a worker who obtains a university degree to convey their ability to employers.
[2] A simple signaling game would have two players, one sender and one receiver. The sender has one of two types that could be denoted, for instance, good and bad with different payoff functions, where the receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type.
[3] The equilibrium concept that is relevant for signaling games is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, that in practice is a refinement of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
[4] In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game, and where providing and receiving information is free. This is in contrast to signaling, in which sending certain messages may be costly for the sender in accordance to the state of the world.
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