Bargaining Game
Bargaining game,[1] bargaining game, won’t be the same
Bargaining game, bargaining game, don’t be insane
Bargaining game, we can improve the outcome of the game[2]
Bargaining game, this your threat point[3]
Bargaining game, reflecting your outside option
Cooperative, what really means being cooperative?
Cooperative, is it convenient to be cooperative?
Is cooperation really enforceable, enforceable
Bargaining game, we can improve the outcome of the game
Bargaining game, this is your threat point
Bargaining game, reflecting your outside option
Efficiency, symmetry, invariance to irrelevant alternatives
Efficiency, symmetry, invariance to affine transformations bargaining solution is unique[4]
Cooperative, what really means being cooperative?
Is it convenient to be cooperative?
Binding agreements are allowed, allowed[5]
Cooperative, what really means to be cooperative?
Is it convenient to be cooperative?
Binding agreements are allowed, allowed, allowed
Cooperative
Efficiency, symmetry, invariance to irrelevant alternatives,
Cooperative
Efficiency, symmetry, invariance to affine transformations
Binding agreements are allowed, allowed.
*Text by Marco Marini. Music by Marco Marini, Elisa Pezzuto and Valter Sacripanti. All rights reserved.
Voices: Marco Marini, Elisa Pezzuto. Guitars: David Pieralisi, Marco Marini, Bass: David Pieralisi. Drum: Valter Sacripanti,
Production: Valter Sacripanti. Mastering: Fabrizio De Carolis.
[1] A bargaining game is a situation where two or more players are negotiating over a given outcome (e.g. how to divide an amount of money or of a production).
[2] By definition, when players start to bargain they expect to improve their outcome with respect to their initial situations.
[3] A bargaining game is characterized by a threat point or outside option at which, if negotiation fails, all players reverse. The value of each players’ threat point matters for the final gain obtained by every player at the bargaining solution.
[4] In the famous Ph.D. thesis, (later published in 1950) John Nash proves that if the game respects the axioms (assumptions) of Symmetry, Invariance to Affine Transformations, Efficiency and Invariance to Irrelevant Alternatives, there is a unique solution to the bargaining game, which can be easily computed by means of the well-known Nash’s product.
[5] The classical distinction between cooperative and noncooperative game is that in the former (differently form the latter) binding agreements between players are allowed.