Perfectly Credible

Track 5: Perfectly Credible*

Being perfectly credible, being perfectly credible[1]

I need to be, I need to be

I need to be perfectly credible, I need to be perfectly credible

I need to be, I need to be, I need to be, I need to be

Walking back along the tree, subgame perfect strategy

I just wanna, I just wanna, I just wanna

I wonderfully rational, wonderfully rational,

I wonderfully rational, wonderfully rational

I need to be perfectly credible, I need to be perfectly credible,

I need to be, I need to be, I need to be, I need to be

Walking back along the tree, subgame perfect strategy[2]

Walking back along the tree, subgame perfect strategy

I just wanna, I just wanna, I just wanna

I wonderfully rational, wonderfully rational

Be perfectly credible, be perfectly credible, be perfectly.

Voices: Marco Marini, Elisa Pezzuto. Guitars: David Pieralisi, Marco Marini, Bass: David Pieralisi. Drum: Valter Sacripanti,

Production: Valter Sacripanti. Mastering: Fabrizio De Carolis.

[1] In a game the credibility of a players’ strategy is relevant and can be defined precisely. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games of perfect information. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium in every subgame (or part) of the original game. Roughly speaking a subgame is a part of the entire game that can be considered independently as a game in miniature of the whole game. This reinforces the equilibrium, that can be, for this, considered as a more rational and credible play.

[2] Backward induction is the process of determining a sequence of optimal choices by reasoning from the endpoint of a problem or situation back along the game-tree. Backward induction involves examining the final point in a series of decisions and identifying the optimal process or action required to arrive at that point. In game theory, backward induction is a method used to compute subgame perfect equilibria in sequential games where the information is perfect, namely players know what all other players have been playing so far.

REFERENCES

Harsanyi, John C., (1967). "Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I-III." Management Science 14 (3): 159-183 (Part I), 14 (5): 320-334 (Part II), 14 (7): 486-502 (Part III).

Harsanyi, John C. (1968a). "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III. Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points". Management Science. 14 (5): 320–334.

Harsanyi, John C. (1968b). "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III. Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game". Management Science. 14 (7): 486–502.